In Appendix A we show in detail how to derive the law of motion of the price level and of real output (20) and (19) in the main text. Appendix B explains in detail how to solve the ICKM. In Appendix C, we analytically derive the mapping g a ( ) and show how to compute the mapping g m ( ) of Section III.A. The price-setting equations used to simulate …rms'prices to obtain the distribution of price changes are derived in Appendix D. In Section III.D, we compute the median of the absolute sizes of price changes from this distribution. In Appendix E, we show how to characterize the pro…t function (27) in the allocation of attention problem. In Appendix F, we assess the robustness of the MDD-based comparison conducted in Section II.C. In Appendix G, we extend the ICKM by considering an monetary policy rule according to which the monetary authority sets the growth rate of money in response to price ‡uctuations.
A Law of Motion of Price and Output in the ICKM
The …rst-order necessary condition 1 of the price-setting problem in the ICKM is: 
It is easy to show that the expression within the round brackets is zero at the deterministic symmetric steady-state. Hence, when one takes the log-linear approximation of the equation above around the deterministic symmetric steady-state, one does not need to care about what is outside those brackets. Hence the price-setting condition can be approximated as follows: In order to take …rm i's price P i;t out of the expectation operator, I need to recall the de…nition of the transformed variables in (1) and then write: 
Recall equation (9):
and thus,
and by rearranging:
This price-setting equation shows that the parameter 1 controls the strategic complementarity in price-setting (i.e., the extent to which …rms want to react to the expected average price E i;t (P t )). In order to have strategic complementarities in price-setting (i.e., …rms want to raise (cut) their prices when the average price goes up (down) ), one needs that 1. If one log-linearizes equation (4) of the main text around the deterministic steady-state, one obtainsp t = Rp i;t di. Hence, by integrating across …rms one obtains:
where it can be shown that R E i;t i;t di = 0. From this equation, repeatedly taking the conditional expectation and averaging across …rms yield:
ln y for j 2 f1; 2; : : :g. By repeatedly substituting these results into the average-price equation one obtains:
By recalling that I de…ned m t ln M t M t and a t ln A t A t and that …rms know all the model parameters, I can re-write the equation above as:
This is measurement equation (20) in the main text. Furthermore, I can combine equations (20) and (9) in the main text to get:
and by re-arranging, this yields:
which is the measurement equation (19) in the main text.
B Solving the ICKM
De…ne the vector F t as
where
Finding an equilibrium for the ICKM requires characterizing the equilibrium law of motion of the …nite-dimensional vector F t . The transition equations of the ICKM can be shown to be:
whereŷ t andp t denote the log-linear deviations of the stationary output, y t Y t =A t , and price, p t P t A t =M t , from their deterministic steady-state, respectively, and where G, H, and d are matrices that are not known yet. Equation (4) stems from detrending and log-linearizing the market clearing conditions in the money market: P t Y t = M t . Equation (5) Finding an equilibrium for this economy amounts to characterize the unknown matrices G, H, and d. This requires solving the following …xed point problem. Given the conjectured law of motion (6), optimal …rms'behavior must exactly aggregate to the conjectured law of motion (6). As suggested by Woodford (2002) , the method of undetermined coe¢ cients can be used to pin down those matrices.
It is easy to see that the …rm i's optimal estimate of the state vector evolves according the so-called Kalman-…lter equation
where k is the 6x2 Kalman gain matrix which is not yet speci…ed. It is easy to show that the one-step-ahead forecast of the state vector is:
I can plug (12) into (11) to get the law of motion for …rm i's estimate of the current state vector
By integrating (13) over …rms one obtains
This result follows from the observing that white noise errors and shocks wash out (i.e. R e t (i) di = 0).
By using the transition equation (6) to get rid of X t in the equation (14) I obtain
Then by integrating (12), which yields the average prior forecast (i.e. X tjt 1 = BX t 1jt 1 ), one notices that the above equation can be rewritten as
Gathering the common terms yields
which can be regarded as the law of motion for the average estimates of the current state vector. It is convenient to de…ne the 6x3 vector ' such that
Then one can note the following
It is easy to prove that equation (16) is indeed true by working as follows
Let us introduce the following notations:
where x t is an arbitrary random variable. Hence I can write
Moreover, it is easy to derive an equation for F tjt from equation (2) 
Combining the last two equations yields
Some easy manipulations lead to
Now recall equation (18) to …nally write
Comparing this equation with the (2) concludes the proof of (16). Now one can plug equation (15) into equation (16) to get
where e k ' 0 k. One can prove the following three facts:
where B y B 0 1 B 0 3 0 and B j stands for the j-th row of B.
FACT 3
Then note that the FACT 3 can be used to show that
The FACT 2 allows is to get the following results:
and e kDBX t 1jt 1 = e kB y X t 1jt 1
Then the FACT 1 can be used in order to prove the following result
By collecting all these results one can rewrite equation (19) as follows
Next, I will work out the vector F t 1 from F t 1jt 1 , since I want to rewrite equation (21) in a form that is comparable to that conjectured in equation (6) so as I can compare our initial guess. One should start from equation (16) to get
By lagging the last equation by one period, one gets
I can now plug equation (22) into equation (21) to get
Now equation (23) has the same form as the bottom rows of equation (6) because X t 1jt 1 does not depend on neither X t 1 nor F t 1 . Thus I can make the following identi…cations:
and
By substituting (24) into the last equation one obtains h B e kB
which identi…es the matrix H. The matrix k is the steady-state matrix of Kalman gains which is well-known to be equal to
with the matrix P that solves the following algebraic Riccati equation
and where B y B 0 1 B 0 3 0 and B j stands for the j-th row of B.
Since B and b turn out to be function of P, the ultimate goal is to …nd out the …xed-point of a larger equation to solve for P, speci…ed solely in terms of model parameters. Computationally, …nding this …xed point turns out to be fast and reliable. This makes the ICKM suitable for estimation.
The loop to numerically …nd out a REE is the following: given a set of parameter values and a guess for the Kalman-gain matrix k 0 , one has to characterize the matrices G, H, and d through equations (24)- (26). Then one has to solve the algebraic Riccati equation (28) for P and obtain a new Kalman-gain matrix k through the equation (27) . Then if the new Kalman-gain matrix is su¢ ciently close to the guess, one has just found the …xed point and stops, otherwise one goes through another loop by using the matrix k as a new guess for the Kalman-gain matrix. Once a …xed point is found, one can use the resulting Kalman-gain matrix to fully characterize the statespace system of the ICKM model described in (6)- (7) through (24)- (28), which combined with the equations (4)- (5) delivers the equilibrium dynamics of the log-deviations of real output and in ‡ation.
C Information Flows
As shown in the main text, the information ‡ow a is measured as follows: 
Now I need to …nd an expression for V AR a t jz t a;i in terms of the information ‡ow a and the variance a .
Combining the equations (29) and (30) 
Hence, I have to characterize the conditional variances of V AR m t jz 1;i , 2 ft 1; tg. Let us de…ne the variance-covariance matrices: (28). The matrix P tjt is de…ned as:
where the matrices D and e have been de…ned in (9) and in (10), respectively. Thus, after one has characterized the …xed point as discussed in Appendix B, one can use the resulting matrix P and equation (35) to pin down the conditional variances V AR m t jz 1;i , for 2 ft 1; tg, the condition entropies H m t jz m;i , for 2 ft 1; tg, through equation (34) 
D Simulating …rm' s prices
Firm's price setting equation is given by
recall that m t = ln M t M t and a t = ln A t A t.
t (i) + 1 E i;t i;t and …nally
So in order to simulate the price setting behavior at the micro level we need to keep track of E i;t i;t . In order to do that we need to set up the following state-space model model for …rms, which hierarchical to the one analyzed in Appendix B: e X i;t = B e X i;t + e be u i;t z i;t = e DX t + e i;t where 
The price equation can then be represented as ln P i;t = ( ; 0; ; 1 ; 0; (1 ) ; = ( + 1)) e X (1)
To see this rewrite the price equation as follows:
E Optimal Allocation of Attention
The objective function in the attention problem (27)-(31) of the main text is de…ned as
t^ t p i;t ;p t ;ŷ t ;q t # where^ t ( ) is the log-quadratic approximation of Q t t , where Q t is the stochastic discount factor that is treated as exogenous by …rms. Let us de…ne the pro…t-maximizing price (i.e., the price that solves the log-quadratic price-setting problem under perfect information.~ m =~ a = 0) asp
up to a constant that is a function of structural parameters.
First note that^ t p } i;t ;p t ;ŷ t ;q t is not a¤ected by the attention problem as the pro…t-maximizing price is obtained by setting~ m =~ a = 0 (i.e., complete information). Hence the objective function in the attention problem can be rewritten as
t andp i;t are stationary processes, they do not depend on t. Therefore,
Recall that in the log-quadratic problemp i;t is de…ned as ln (P i;t =P t ). Hence,
It then follows
The price-setting equations under complete and incomplete information (see appendix A) are 
where the matrix e P tjt 1 is the matrix P in equation (41) 
F Robustness Checks
The Marginal Data Density (MDD) associated with a model is de…ned as the integral of the likelihood with respect to the prior over the parameter space. Therefore, it can be regarded as a measure of con ‡icting information in the likelihood and in the prior. As the variance of the prior changes, the MDD also varies. Therefore, one may be concerned about the robustness of the …gures in Table 3 .
To address this concern, I have computed the marginal data density (MDD) of the two structural models using the following prior speci…cations. The …rst prior is more dogmatic than that in the paper. The second prior is more loose than that in the paper. 3 dogmatic only with respect to , which a¤ects the strategic complementarity in price setting. In addition, I consider two other prior speci…cations: (1) Dogmatic Prior #2, whose second moments are the same as those of the Dogmatic Prior of Table 1 except for those for the parameters that are speci…c to the Calvo model (i.e., pc and !). The prior variance for those parameters is the same as that in the paper. (2) Loose Prior #2, whose second moments are the same as those of the Loose Prior of Table 1 except for those for the parameters that are speci…c to the Calvo model (i.e., pc and !). The prior variance for those parameters is the same as that in the paper. In a nutshell, Dogmatic Prior #2 is more dogmatic than the prior in the paper but only regarding the ICKM parameters. Analogously, the Loose Prior #2 is broader than the prior used in the paper, but only for the ICKM parameters. Table 1 summarizes the prior and posterior statistics associated with the prior distributions used in the exercise.
The MDD associated with the two structural models under all the prior speci…cations are reported in Table 2 . The MDD associated with the ICKM is always larger than the Calvo model under all prior speci…cations. This means that the ICKM attains a larger posterior probability than the Calvo model under all the prior speci…cations considered. This result shows the robustness of the …nding in the paper to changes in the prior variance. Furthermore, the results in Table 2 suggest that the MDD associated with the Calvo model is very sensitive to the prior variance for its speci…c parameters (i.e., pc and !), while the MDD associated with the ICKM seems to be fairly insensitive to the prior speci…cation.
G Endogenous Monetary Policy Rule
The central bank sets the stock of money M t following the rule below:
where P t is the price level, p < 0 is a parameter that controls how aggressively the central bank adjusts the stock of money to changes in the price level, and ln M t is the exogenous component because the prior used in the paper is an inverted gamma distribution whose degree of freedom is 1.
Log Marginal Data Density ICKM Calvo
Prior 
The rest of the model is the same as the ICKM presented in Section I of the main text. The equilibrium conditions in the money market implies that ln M t = ln P t + ln Y t . Substituting the money rule into this equilibrium condition yields:
Note that 1 p 1. When p = 0, one is back to the situation of the paper in which the central bank does not directly react to in ‡ation and successfully controls the nominal output. See equation (9). When the central bank sets its monetary instrument to stabilize the price level ( p < 0), then one obtains that a linear combination of price level and real output follows an exogenous process. The more aggressively the central bank targets price stability, that is, the larger 1 p in equation (48), the more the price level responds to shocks.
The optimal price-setting equation can be derived following the steps in Appendix A and reads ln P i;t = E i;t [ ln Y t + ln P t ln A t ] ln y:
The equation (48) allows one to substitute ln Y t out from equation (49):
ln P i;t = E i;t 1 1 p ln P t + ln M t ln A t ln y:
This price-setting equation shows that the parameter (1 (1 )) 1 (1 ) ( + 1) 1 = 1 1 + 1 controls the strategic complementarity in price-setting (i.e., the extent to which …rms want to react to the expected average price E i;t (P t )). Note that the more aggressively the central bank respond
